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Criminal Law and Procedure.  State v. Mensah, 227 A.3d 
474 (R.I. 2020).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court applies an abuse 
of discretion standard of review when analyzing a trial justice’s 
decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island 
Rules of Evidence.  If the record provides support for the trial 
justice’s decision, abuse of discretion is not found.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In September 2017, the defendant, Eric Mensah (Mensah) was 
convicted for sexual assault charges against his daughter, Emma,1 
who was eight years old at the time.2  Specifically, Mensah was 
charged with two counts each of first-degree and second-degree 
child molestation sexual assault.3  In 2014, Emma moved into her 
father’s apartment located in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, after 
relocating from Ghana.4  In December of 2015, Emma revealed to 
her babysitter, Luz Velez (Velez) that she had been sexually 
assaulted by her father shortly after her arrival from Ghana.5  This 
disclosure to Velez, along with an investigation of the defendant, 
culminated in Mensah’s indictment on May 6, 2016.6  On June 8, 
2016, Mensah pled not guilty to the charges.7  Mensah’s trial took 
place on September 14, 2017, where Emma revealed the details of 
her father’s sexual abuse.8  Emma testified that shortly after 
arriving from Ghana, in the summer of 2014, defendant assaulted 
her for twenty to thirty minutes while she and defendant “took a 
1. State v. Mensah, 227 A.3d 474, 476 (R.I. 2020).  “Emma” is a pseudo-





6. Id. at 476–77.
7. Id. at 477.
8. Id.
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nap together after coming home from a meat store.”9  While lying 
on the bed, “defendant removed the blanket that was covering 
Emma, took off her clothes and turned her over.”10  Defendant then 
proceeded to “touch the inside of her ‘butt’ as his body ‘moved up 
and down’” and inserted his finger into her vagina.11  Defendant 
halted his abuse when Emma told defendant she would call the 
police if he did not stop.12  Promising a trip to Chuck E. Cheese the 
next day, Mensah instructed Emma to keep what had happened to 
herself.13  Defendant further threatened to send Emma back to 
Ghana if she told anyone what had occurred in the apartment.14 
Emma further testified about the details of the July 23, 2015, 
incident (“the lost earring incident”).15  After losing an earring, 
defendant warned Emma she would not attend a field trip the next 
day if she did not find it.16  However, even though she eventually 
found the earring, Mensah nevertheless proceeded to beat his 
daughter with a hanger.17  Hearing gagging noises and screaming 
while leaving the apartment complex, Timothy Orr, who lived on 
the floor above Mensah called the police after knocking on Mensah’s 
door with no response.18  When the police came, Mensah instructed 
Emma to get in the shower.19  At trial, when the police revealed 
that Emma had told them she was “fine,”20 she explained that she 
lied to them in order to avoid a beating from her father.21  Emma 
also testified about three other incidents of sexual abuse by 
Mensah.22  Ultimately, Emma revealed her abuse to her babysitter, 














22. See id. at 479.
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rape and murder.23  At trial, Mensah’s brother, sister-in-law, and a 
friend with whom he grew up in Ghana testified on his behalf.24  
Seeking to admit additional evidence of both sexual and nonsexual 
abuse and conduct by Mensah, including reports about Mensah 
asking his daughter about her intimate parts and additional sexual 
contact initiated by defendant, the State filed a motion in limine.25  
The State was especially interested in bringing in evidence of 
Mensah’s nonsexual abuse, including a July 23, 2015, incident 
when police were called to defendant’s home, and an incident in 
which Mensah had used a hanger to hit his daughter.26   
The State argued the evidence should be admitted under rule 
404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence because the evidence 
helped explain why Emma was afraid to disclose the sexual abuse, 
how the abuse stopped suddenly, and why Emma feared no one 
would believe her allegations.27 Defendant, however, argued that 
the alleged acts that occurred on July 23 were not sufficiently 
similar to the charges against the defendant to be admissible.28  In 
particular, defendant argued that the conduct on July 23 was not 
sexual in nature, and therefore was not similar to the current 
charges.29  In addition, Mensah argued that evidence of other 
alleged sexual abuse was inadmissible “because it was uncharged, 
prejudicial evidence.”30  The trial justice explained that she would 
allow evidence of the July 23 charges but exclude evidence that 
“defendant’s pants were unbuttoned.”31  In addition, evidence of the 
defendant’s other alleged “uncharged sexual contact” would be 
admitted because “the evidence would tend to demonstrate [a] lewd 
disposition toward [Emma], intent, plan, opportunity, or design.”32 
Utilizing Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Mensah moved for a new trial, arguing there was 
23. See id. at 479.
24. Id. at 481.







32. Id. at 477.
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insufficient evidence to charge him with penile penetration of his 
daughter’s anus and digital penetration of his daughter’s vagina.33  
Defendant pointed to a previous court holding, In re B.H.,34 in 
making his argument that there was “insufficient [evidence] to 
prove anal penetration,” comparing Emma’s testimony to the 
testimony given at the In re B.H. trial.35  Mensah further argued 
that Emma’s “imprecise” and “vague” testimony did not support 
count two of the charge.36  Defendant argued that the “weight of the 
evidence was insufficient for a conviction, specifically contending 
that Emma was not a believable witness.”37 
Ultimately, the trial justice denied Mensah’s motion for a new 
trial.38  In her bench decision, the trial justice addressed both the 
‘insufficient evidence’ argument and the ‘weight of the evidence’ 
argument.39  The trial justice first explained the standard used 
when presented with an argument dealing with the weight of the 
evidence.40  While she thought Mensah “probably was” guilty, she 
revealed that had she been a juror she would not have thought the 
State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.41  However, the 
trial justice stated that reasonable minds could differ.42  In regard 
to the insufficient evidence argument, the trial justice pointed to In 
re B.H. to distinguish Mensah’s current case.43  Because Emma had 
“reported anal pain” and testified that “defendant was moving back 
and forth,” the trial justice found this evidence to be sufficient.44 
33. Id. at 482.
34. In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774 (R.I. 2016).









44. Id.  The trial justice noted that Emma’s testimony about “anal pain,”
coupled with her  description of defendant’s movements, were “more than the 
complainant in In re B.H. had testified to.”  Id. As a result, the trial justice 
deemed Emma’s testimony sufficient enough to evidence anal penetration.  Id. 
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After trial, Mensah appealed his case to the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court.45   
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal, Mensah put forth two arguments.  First, Mensah 
argued that “the July 2015 ‘lost earring’ incident should not have 
been admitted under Rule 404(b).”46  Secondly, Mensah argued that 
the “trial justice erred by denying his motion for a new trial.”47  The 
Court began its analysis by stating that the abuse of discretion 
standard is the proper standard of review when reviewing a trial 
court’s decision to admit Rule 404(b) evidence.48  In addition, the 
Court noted that a trial justice does not abuse their discretion 
where the record provides an explanation supporting the decision 
made by the trial justice.49   
A. Rule 404(b) Evidence
Addressing the first issue—whether the July 2015 incident was
properly admitted—the Court provided an explanation of the raise-
or-waive rule.  In particular, the rule mandates litigants to “raise 
all their claims for relief in the trial court and properly articulate 
them to a judge for a ruling.”50  After noting Mensah’s only objection 
to the admission of the July 2015 incident was at the state’s motion 
in limine, the Court stated firmly that this objection was not enough 
to preserve the evidentiary issue on appeal.51  The Court explained 
its reasoning behind the statement, pointing to prior holdings 
which made clear that a motion in limine was “preliminary in 
nature” and, therefore, provided no finality on questions pertaining 
to the admissibility of evidence.52  As such, Mensah’s ability to 




48. Id. at 483 (citing State v. Perry, 182 A.3d 558, 568 (R.I. 2018)).
49. Id. (quoting State v. Rainey, 175 A.3d 1169, 1182 (R.I. 2018)).
50. Id. at 483 (citing State v. Andrade, 209 A.3d 1185, 1194 (R.I 2019)).
51. Id.
52. Id. (State v. Colon, 198 A.3d 1249, 1255 (R.I. 2019)).
2021] SURVEY SECTION 859 
incident had effectively been waived as a result of his failure to 
raise a timely objection at trial.53  
B. Motion for a New Trial
Next, the Court addressed defendant’s claim that the trial
justice erred in refusing to grant his motion for a new trial.  The 
Court began by explaining that “it is well settled that a defendant 
arguing a motion for a new trial may do so on [either] 1) 
insufficiency of the evidence or 2) weight of the evidence.”54  Noting 
Mensah’s argument mingled the two bases together, the Court 
proceeded to divide its analysis of Mensah’s argument.55 
1. Insufficiency of the Evidence
The Court first addressed defendant’s argument that there was
insufficient evidence.56  When reviewing a trial justice’s decision on 
an ‘insufficiency of the evidence’ basis, the Court explained, a de 
novo standard of review is applied and the Court “examine[s] the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.”57  Therefore, a 
guilty verdict by a jury will not be overturned unless the Court 
concludes that “no reasonable jury could have rendered it.”58  
Likewise, a trial justice must read the evidence in favor of the 
prosecution when a “sufficiency of the evidence” challenge is 
presented.59  In doing so, the trial justice must examine the 
evidence “without assessing the weight of the evidence or the 
credibility of the witnesses, and draw all reasonable inferences 
consistent with guilt, mindful that the jury likewise has done so.”60 
Accordingly, the Court stated the definition of sexual 
penetration61 as written in the Rhode Island General Laws section 
53. See id. at 484.
54. Id. (quoting State v. McDonald, 157 A.3d 1080, 1088 (R.I. 2017)).
55. See id.
56. Id. at 485.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 571 (R.I. 2009)).
59. See id. at 484.
60. Id.
61. Id.  The Court defines sexual penetration as follows:
Sexual penetration is defined in our general laws as[ ] ‘sexual intercourse, cun-
nilingus, fellatio, and anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, 
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11-37-1(8).62  After stating the definition of sexual penetration,
which includes “anal intercourse,” the Court proceeded to
distinguish Mensah’s case from In re B.H., a case in which the Court
found that the charge of first-degree child molestation was based on
insufficient evidence.63  In Mensah’s case, however, the Court found
Emma’s testimony sufficient because, unlike In re B.H., Emma’s
testimony was “more precise[ ]” and “[more] detail[ed].”64  Because
Emma’s testimony was sufficient to support Mensah’s charge of
first-degree child molestation, the Court stated that the trial justice
properly rejected Mensah’s motion for a new trial on “sufficiency
grounds.”65
2. Weight of the Evidence
Next the Court addressed defendant’s argument regarding the
weight of the evidence.  When reviewing a trial justice’s decision on 
a “weight of the evidence” basis, the Court’s review of the trial 
justice’s decision is deferential.66  The Court explained the proper 
procedure a trial justice must take when presented with a motion 
for a new trial on weight of the evidence grounds: acting as a 
“thirteenth juror,” the trial justice independently assesses the 
evidence by considering the “credibility of the witnesses and . . . the 
weight of the evidence.”67 
The Court highlighted that absent clear error or a 
misconception of the evidence, the trial justice’s decision will not be 
overturned so long as the trial justice “articulates adequate 
grounds” for the decision.68  Disagreeing with Mensah’s contention 
that “no reasonable mind could have found him guilty of the 
charges” and finding that the trial justice applied the appropriate 
by any part of a person’s body or by any object into the genital or anal openings 
of another person’s body, or the victim’s own body upon the accused’s instruc-
tion, but emission of semen is not required.  
 Id. (quoting 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS 11-37-1(8)). 




66. Id. at 486.
67. Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 199 A.3d 1046, 1050–51 (R.I. 2019)).
68. Id.
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standard of review, the Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of 
Mensah’s motion for a new trial.69 
COMMENTARY 
This case undoubtedly provides an excellent example of the 
imperative of meticulously studying all facets of relevant caselaw, 
paying particular attention to all the rules and procedures 
governing courtroom procedures.  Defendant’s argument that the 
State had the means to present its case using less prejudicial 
evidence is compelling, but one can only speculate whether 
Mensah’s appeal would have secured a better outcome had counsel 
raised a timely objection to the State’s presentation of the July 2015 
incident.  
The Court’s explanation regarding its belief that the State 
presented sufficient evidence of sexual penetration is quite 
straightforward, but it would have been helpful had the Court also 
provided guidelines and instruction about the required details 
necessary for evidencing sexual penetration.  But Mensah, at least, 
seems to indicate that reports of pain is a compelling factor in the  
Court’s analysis.  Despite the need for more instruction regarding 
evidence of sexual penetration, the Court does an efficient job 
providing a thorough explanation of its reasoning as it pertains to 
its holding in Mensah. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court ultimately rejected defendant’s argument that 
reasonable minds could not have found him guilty of the charges.70  
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, 
holding that the trial justice applied the proper standard of review 
and, therefore, appropriately denied defendant’s motion for a new  
trial after finding that reasonable minds could differ from her own 
conclusions.71 
 Ruth C. Nwauche 
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
